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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-MARYLAND'S DRUG-FREE
SCHOOL ZONE STATUTE, WHICH INCREASES
PENALTIES FOR DISTRIBUTION OF CONTROLLED
DANGEROUS SUBSTANCES WITHIN 1000 FEET OF
SCHOOL PROPERTY, SATISFIES DUE PROCESS
REQUIREMENTS. Dawson v. State, 329 Md. 275, 619 A.2d
111 (1993).
I. INTRODUCTION
In recent years, drug-related crime has grown to epidemic pro-
portions. The casualties stemming from the growing drug trade have
extended far beyond the stereotypical junkie or pusher. Countless
innocent people continue to be victimized by drug-related violence.
The most frightening reality is that many of those harmed are our
nation's children.
To combat this alarming trend, Congress and malny state gov-
ernments have enacted various laws designed to assure victory in the
war on drugs.' The enactment of drug-free school zone statutes is
one such effort to protect children from the evils of the drug trade.
Drug-free school zone statutes, hereinafter referred to as "school-
yard statutes," furnish heightened punishments for drug-related crimes
occurring within a specified distance from a school.2
In Dawson v. State,3 the Court of Appeals of Maryland reviewed
Maryland's school-yard statute, codified at Article 27, section 286D
of the Maryland Annotated Code,4 and held that the law did not
1. See 21 U.S.C. § 860 (Supp. IV 1992); ALA. CODE § 13A-12-250 (1994 Repl.
Vol.); ARIZ. REv. STAT. ANN. § 13-3411 (1994); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 893.13(1)(d)
(West 1994); GA. CODE AN r. § 16-13-32.4 (1992); MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, §
286D (1992 Repl. Vol.); MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 94C § 32J (West Supp.
1995); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 193-B:2 (1995 Cum. Supp. 1995); N.J. STAT.
ANN. § 2C:35-7 (West Cum. Supp. 1995); UTAH CODE ANN. § 58-37-8(5)
(Supp. 1994); VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-255.2 (Michie 1995 Cum. Supp.); Wis.
STAT. § 161.49 (Supp. 1994); WYO. STAT. § 35-7-1036 (1994).
2. See infra notes 30-39 (discussing the Maryland drug-free school zone statute
and the penalties assessed under the statute); see also infra notes 42-50 (dis-
cussing the federal school-yard statute and the penalties assessed under the
statute). Another related statute designed to protect children, which may soon
be enacted in Maryland, would establish a weapons-free school zone. See infra
note 173.
3. 329 Md. 275, 619 A.2d 111 (1993).
4. MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 286D (1992 Repl. Vol.).
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violate due process under either the state or the federal constitutions.
The court of appeals found that the statute was rationally related to
the legislative goal of shielding children from corruption by the drug
trade. 6 The Dawson decision is significant because it is the first
Maryland case to affirm the constitutionality of the Maryland school-
yard statute. The Dawson opinion also clarified the policy and the
legislative intent behind the school-yard statute.'
In Dawson v. State,' three undercover deputies of the Harford
County Sheriff's Department noticed a group of people gathered
near a wall within 1000 feet of Hall Cross Elementary School during
an undercover drug operation in Harford County, Maryland. 9 As the
deputies drove by, a young man sitting on the wall signaled to the
car and indicated for them to return.' 0 After the driver stopped the
car across the street from the young man, the young man approached
the passenger side of the car and asked what the deputies were
looking for. One of the deputies answered that they were looking
for "coke."" Following a short conversation, the deputy agreed to
buy a quarter-gram of cocaine. 12
The young man then retrieved a small packet of cocaine from
a pack of Newport cigarettes and sold the cocaine packet to the
deputy for $25.00.13 The individual refused to give his name, but he
indicated that he could always be found sitting on the wall and that
if they wanted cocaine they should look for him there. 14 The young
man then returned to the wall, and the deputies drove away. 5
5. Dawson, 329 Md. at 275, 619 A.2d at 111.
6. Id. at 286-87, 619 A.2d at 116-17.
7. See id. at 285, 619 A.2d at 116; see also infra text accompanying notes 139-
44. If the Maryland General Assembly eventually enacts a weapons-free school
zone statute, similar constitutional challenges will likely follow, and the Dawson
decision will provide courts with significant precedent upon which to uphold
weapons-free legislation. Consequently, the Dawson decision will not only
advance substantially the war against drugs, it may also increase legislative
efforts to provide children with a safer educational environment. For a dis-
cussion of the progression of the proposed weapons-free zone statute through
Maryland's General Assembly, see infra note 173 and accompanying text.
8. Dawson, 329 Md. at 279, 619 A.2d at 113.
9. Id. The officers were attempting to make undercover drug purchases while
driving on East Belair Avenue; they noticed the group by the wall as they




13. Id. The deputy attempted to learn the seller's name by inquiring whom to ask
for if they wanted more cocaine. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id. The entire transaction lasted about one minute. After leaving the scene,
the deputies contacted the Aberdeen Police Department and requested that a
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Officer Osbourne and another officer were dispatched by the
Aberdeen Police Department and went to the location of the sale.' 6
As the policemen approached, the majority of the group disbanded,
but two young men remained by the wall. 7 Officer Osbourne rec-
ognized that the individual sitting on the wall fit the description of
the drug seller and asked for his identification. 8 The man identified
himself as Stacey Eugene Dawson. 19 The officer found a pack of
Newport cigarettes containing several packages of cocaine close to
where Dawson was sitting. 20 Officer Osbourne arrested Dawson.
Dawson was indicted by the Grand Jury of Harford County for
unlawful distribution of a controlled substance and for unlawful
distribution of a controlled substance within 1000 feet of school
property.2' Dawson was found guilty on both counts, in a jury trial,
in the Circuit Court for Harford County. 22 Dawson appealed to the
Court of Special Appeals of Maryland.23 The Court of Appeals of
Maryland granted certiorari before review by the intermediate court.24
On appeal, Dawson contended that his conviction should be
reversed on two grounds: (1) that there was insufficient evidence to
support the verdict, and (2) that the statute criminalizing the distri-
bution of a controlled dangerous substance within 1000 feet of school
property25 violated the due process requirements of the United States
Constitution and the Maryland Declaration of Rights. 26 The court of
appeals held that there was sufficient evidence for a rational jury to
find that Dawson was, in fact, the young man who had sold the
uniformed officer meet them. Id. at 280, 619 A.2d at 113. Officer Osbourne,
the officer dispatched, met the deputies within minutes. The deputy who
conducted the transaction, Corporal Taylor, then gave Officer Osbourne a
description of the seller and of the location of the sale. Corporal Taylor
instructed the officer to return to the area to learn the seller's name and
address. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id. Most of the group disbanded as they saw the policemen approaching. Of




21. Id. Dawson was convicted of distribution of a controlled dangerous substance
under MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 286(a)(1) (1992 Repl. Vol.), and for unlawful
distribution of a controlled dangerous substance under MD. ANN. CODE art.




25. MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 286D (1992 Repl. Vol.).
26. Dawson, 329 Md. at 280-81, 619 A.2d at 114 (citing MD. ANN. CODE art. 27,
§ 286D).
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cocaine to the undercover police officers. 27 More significantly, how-
ever, the court ruled that section 286D did not violate the defendant's
right to due process. 28 The court affirmed Dawson's convictions. 29
II. BACKGROUND
Section 286D3 0 created a separate and distinct felony from that
created in Maryland's general statute, section 286. 31 For example,
section 286 makes manufacturing, distributing, dispensing or pos-
sessing controlled dangerous substances a felony, regardless of where
the offense occurs,32 while Maryland's school-yard statute, section
286D, provides in pertinent part:
(a) A person who manufactures, distributes, dispenses, or
possesses with intent to distribute a controlled dangerous
substance in violation of § 286(a)(1)33 of this subheading,
or who conspires to commit any of these offenses, is guilty
of a felony if the offense occurred:
(1) In, on, or within 1,000 feet of any real property
owned by or leased to any elementary school, secondary
school or school board, and used for elementary or second-
ary education, as defined under § 1-10114 of the Education
Article, regardless of whether:
(i) School was in session at the time of the
offense; or
(ii) The real property was being used for other
purposes besides school purposes at the time of the offense;
or
(2) On a school vehicle, as defined under § 11-15415
of the Transportation Article.3 6
27. Id. at 282, 619 A.2d at 114.
28. Id. at 290, 619 A.2d at 118.
29. Id.
30. MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 286D (1992 Repl. Vol.).
31. Id. § 286.
32. Id.
33. Id. § 286(a)(1). Section 286(a)(1) deems it unlawful "[tlo manufacture, distrib-
ute, or dispense, or to possess a controlled dangerous substance in sufficient
quantity to reasonably indicate under all circumstances an intent to manufac-
ture, distribute, or dispense, a controlled dangerous substance . . . ." Id.
34. MD. CODE ANN., EDUC. § 1-101 (1992 Repl. Vol.). This section provides that,
'Elementary and secondary education' means education and programs of
education from and including preschool through the end of high school and
their equivalent." Id. § 1-101(g).
35. MD. CODE ANN., TRANsp. § 11-154 (1992 Repl. Vol.). A school vehicle is any
motor vehicle that "[is used regularly for the exclusive transportation of
children, students, or teachers for educational purposes or in connection with
a school activity . . . ." Id. § 11-154(a)(1); see also MD. CODE ANN., TRsp.
99 11-173 to -174 (1994 Cum. Supp.) (describing types of school vehicles).
36. MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 286D.
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The penalty for conviction under section 286D is imprisonment
for no more than twenty years, a fine of no more than $20,000, or
both, for the first offense.3 7 For a second or subsequent offense
under the statute, the offender is eligible for imprisonment for
between five and forty years, a fine of no more than $40,000, or
both.38 The penalties imposed under section 286D substantially aug-
ment those that may be applied, simultaneously, under section 286,
the general statute. 39
The Maryland school-yard statute is modeled after a similar New
Jersey statute, 40 which was modeled after the federal school-yard
statute. 4' A person is eligible for prosecution under the federal statute,
Article 21, section 860 of the United States Code,42 if he has violated
Article 21, section 841(a)(1) of the same code. 43 Section 860(a)
outlaws:
distributing, possessing with intent to distribute, or manu-
facturing a controlled substance in or on, or within one
thousand feet of, the real property comprising a public or
private elementary, vocational, or secondary school or a
public or private college, junior college, or university, or a
playground, ... or within 100 feet of a public or private
youth center, public swimming pool, or video arcade facility
Section 860 is a penalty enhancer. The penalty for a first offense
under section 860 is twice the length of incarceration or twice the
term of supervised release and up to double the fine that would
otherwise be imposed under section 841. 45 A minimum sentence of
37. Id. § 286D(b)(l).
38. Id. § 286D(b)(l)(ii).
39. Section 286 imposes penalties of either not more than 5 years or 20 years, or
a fine of no more than $15,000, $20,000, or $25,000, depending upon the
classification of the drug involved in the offense. Id. § 286(b)(1)-(3). Both
imprisonment and fines may be imposed upon an offender. Id. For a second
violation of the statute, the offender is to be imprisoned for not less than 2
years or 10 years, depending upon the drug classification involved. Id. §
286(b)(3)-(c).
40. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:35-7 (West Supp. 1995).
41. See Dawson v. State, 329 Md. 275, 285 nn.3-4, 619 A.2d 111, 116 nn.3-4
(1993). The federal statute, initially codified as 21 U.S.C. § 845a (1985), has
been recodified at 21 U.S.C. § 860 (Supp. IV 1992). Cases decided prior to
the statute's recodification refer to the statute as § 845a, and are, therefore,
referred to in this Casenote as such.
42. 21 U.S.C. § 860 (Supp. IV 1992).
43. Id. § 860(a).
44. Id.
45. Id.
19951 Dawson v. State
one year imprisonment is also mandated for first offenders.4 Under
section 860, second offenders are subject to the greater of either
three times the maximum penalty otherwise provided under section
841 for a first offense or a prison term of between three years and
life imprisonment. 47 A second offender must also be sentenced for
up to three times the term of supervised release authorized by section
841 for a first offense. 48 Up to three times the fine imposed by
section 841 may be imposed in addition to any imprisonment. 49
Moreover, under section 860, second offenders are ineligible for
parole or probation until the minimum sentence is fulfilled.50
A. The Irrebuttable Presumption Argument
Many state school-yard statutes, and the federal school-yard
statute, have been challenged under the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment.51 Specifically, it has been argued that school-
yard statutes violate defendants' due process rights by "creating ...
unwarranted irrebuttable presumption[s] that [all] sale[s] of narcotics
within 1000 feet of a school ha[ve] the detrimental effects upon
school children that Congress sought to avoid .... "52 This due-
process argument, known as the irrational or irrebuttable presumption
argument, has been expressly rejected by many courts because of a
long-held rule which provides that "a statutory presumption cannot
be sustained if there be no rational connection between the fact
proved and the ultimate fact presumed.""3
This rule was applied by the Federal District Court for the
Southern District of New York in United States v. Nieves. 4 In Nieves,
46. Id. § 860(a). The minimum sentence for first offenders, however, is not applied
to offenses involving five grams or fewer of marijuana. Id.
47. Id. § 860(b).
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Id. § 860(d).
51. U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV, § 1. "No State shall make or enforce any law which
shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor
shall any state deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal
protection of the laws." Id. (emphasis added).
52. United States v. Agilar, 779 F.2d 123, 125 (2d Cir. 1985); see also Leary v.
United States, 395 U.S. 6 (1969) (holding that statute allowing presumption of
unlawful importation from the defendant's possession of marijuana violated
due process); Tot v. United States, 319 U.S. 463 (1943) (holding that statute,
which allowed the possession of a firearm or ammunition by anyone convicted
of a crime or a fugitive from justice to support a presumption that such
firearm or ammunition was shipped, transported or received in violation of
the statute, violated due process).
53. See, e.g., Tot, 319 U.S. at 467.
54. United States v. Nieves, 608 F. Supp. 1147 (S.D.N.Y. 1985).
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the court held that there was a rational basis to presume that all
drug sales occurring within 1000 feet of school grounds posed a
danger to children. Therefore, the court concluded that increased
penalties for those convicted of selling drugs within 1000 feet of
school grounds were substantially related to the legislative goal of
protecting children from the drug trade." Specifically, the court
reasoned:
Whether .or not a child is involved in or otherwise present
during any particular sale of narcotics within one thousand
feet of a school, subjecting the seller to enhanced penalties
reasonably may be expected to deter the seller and other
illicit dealers from conducting their operations near school
property in the future. In such areas, where children con-
gregate in large numbers before, during, and after school
sessions, they are readily subject to the illicit activities of
those who ply narcotics to the victims of drug abuse and
addiction.... Indeed judicial notice may be taken of the
destructive results of drug addiction, the source of which
Congress clearly intended to keep out of the easy reach of
school-age children. It is difficult to imagine a more rational
way of keeping drug traffickers out of areas where children
are more likely to come into contact with them than to
subject them to a risk of stiffer penalties for doing business
near school property.5 6
The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
followed this reasoning in United States v. Holland.51 In Holland,
the defendant argued that it was unfair to presume 'from the
proven fact [that the defendant sold drugs within 1000 feet of a
school], that the perpetrator was deserving of substantially greater
punishment than would ordinarily be tolerated [if the defendant had
simply sold drugs]."' s In rejecting the defendant's argument, the
Holland court ruled that the federal statute did not impose such a
presumption because Congress determined that the enhanced penalty
was justified as a matter of law.5 9 The Holland court, therefore,
distinguished the federal statute from those that "allowed the trier
of fact to predicate guilt on a set of facts presumed from a set of
facts proved."60
55. Id. at 1149.
56. Id. at 1149-50.
57. United States v. Holland, 810 F.2d 1215, 1220 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
58. Id.
59. Id. at 1221.
60. Id. at 1220 (emphasis in original).
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In United States v. Campbell,61 in accordance with the judgments
in both Nieves62 and Holland,63 the United States Court of Appeals
for the Fourth Circuit sustained the validity of the federal school-
yard statute. The statute was challenged as one that created an
unconstitutional irrebutable presumption." The Campbell court held
that the enhanced penalty created under the federal school-yard
statute was "rationally related to a legitimate government interest-
keeping drugs away from the nation's schools. ' 65
In addition, the Campbell court ruled that the statute did not
create "an impermissible evidentiary presumption of guilt . . . but
rather evince[d] a permissible legislative determination of the appro-
priate punishment for those who engage[d] in drug transactions near
schools. '"66 In support of these decisions, many other federal and
state courts have determined that the increased sentences provided
by school-yard statutes were rationally related to the purpose for
which they were enacted. 67
61. United States v. Campbell, 935 F.2d 39 (4th Cir. 1991).
62. For a discussion of United States v. Nieves, see supra text accompanying notes
54-56.
63. For a discussion of United States v. Holland, see supra text accompanying
notes 57-60.
64. Campbell, 935 F.2d at 45.
65. Id.
66. Id. (citations omitted).
67. See United States v. Crew, 916 F.2d 980, 983 (5th Cir. 1990) (finding defen-
dant's irrebuttable presumption argument meritless); United States v. Rowe,
911 F.2d 50, 52 (8th Cir. 1990) (finding that federal statute rationally achieved
the goal of lessening the risk of drug availability to school children); United
States v. Thornton, 901 F.2d 738, 740 (9th Cir. 1990) (rejecting irrebuttable
presumption argument because Congress had determined, as a matter of law,
that drug sales near schools injured children and warranted greater penalties);
United States v. Cross, 900 F.2d 66, 69 (6th Cir. 1990) (holding that federal
statute did not "establish an irrational presumption of guilt in violation of due
process"); United States v. Agilar, 779 F.2d 123, 125-26 (2d Cir. 1985) (rejecting
the irrebuttable presumption argument and stating: "[Tihe proscription of sales
within the environs of schools is a rational means of reducing the risk of easy
availability that can lead to such acquisition"); United States v. Jones, 779
F.2d 121, 122-23 (2d Cir. 1985) (finding that federal statute sought to prevent
availability of drugs to school children at "local hangouts" and, therefore,
that defendant's offense, at a "bar/numbers joint" within 1000 feet of a
school, was within the "congressional proscription"); United States v. Dixon,
619 F. Supp. 1399, 1400 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (rejecting defendant's irrebuttable
presumption argument); State v. Rodriguez, 542 A.2d 966, 970 (N.J. Super.
Ct. Law Div. 1988) (finding New Jersey school-yard statute "reasonably related
to a legitimate legislative purpose"); State v. Moore, 782 P.2d 497, 502 (Utah
1989) ("[T]he [Utah school-yard] statute does not presume the presence of
children during a drug transaction . . . [instead it] envisions the plausible risks
to the health and safety of children who may become participants in and
victims of drug transactions."); Commonwealth v. Burns, 395 S.E.2d 456, 459
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B. The Specific Knowledge Argument
United States v. Falu6 addressed another common due-process
ground for assault on the school-yard statutes-the defendant's lack
of specific knowledge of his proximity of the school at the time of
the offense.6 9 In Falu, the defendant contended that, absent a re-
quirement that the offender be aware of the proximity to the school,
the statute failed to provide fair notice that the offense was subject
to stiffer penalties.70 The Falu court disagreed and held that the
federal school-yard statute incorporated the same mens rea require-
ment as section 841-knowingly distributing controlled substances.,,
The court, therefore, reasoned that if a defendant knowingly sold a
controlled substance within 1000 feet of school grounds, he would
be guilty of violating section 860, regardless of his awareness of his
proximity to the school during the drug sale. 72
The Falu court also found that "Congress evidently intended
that dealers and their aiders and abettors bear the burden of ascer-
taining where schools are located and removing their operations from
those areas or else face enhanced penalties. ' ' 73 Moreover, according
to the Falu court, the legislative policy of the statute would be
undermined if the statute were read to require that the dealer know
that the prohibited transaction was occurring within the school zone. 74
Federal and state courts have been virtually unanimous in adopt-
ing the Falu court's reasoning concerning the mens rea element of
the school-yard statute." Nevertheless, the Supreme Court of New
(Va. 1990) (holding that Virginia school-yard statute incorporated a legislative
finding, not a presumption, and that the "aggravated nature" of drug trans-
actions within 1,000 feet of a school merited additional punishment); State v.
Hermann, 474 N.W.2d 906, 912 (Wis. Ct. App. 1991) (rejecting defendant's
irrebuttable presumption argument and holding that Wisconsin school yard
statute reflected that "the fact proved [the proximity to school premises was]
rationally related to the ultimate fact presumed (particular harm to children)").
68. United States v. Falu, 776 F.2d 46 (2d Cir. 1985).
69. Id. at 49.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 50.
72. Id. "In this respect, the schoolyard statute resembles other federal criminal
laws, which provide enhanced penalties or allow conviction for obviously
antisocial conduct upon proof of a fact of which the defendant need not be
aware." Id.
73. Id.
74. Id. The court also cited United States v. Cunningham, 615 F. Supp. 519
(S.D.N.Y. 1985), for the proposition that, according to the federal statute's
plain language, no proof of knowledge or intent was required for conviction.
Falu, 776 F.2d at 50.
75. See United States v. Cross, 900 F.2d 66, 69 (6th Cir. 1990) ("Based upon the
analysis in Holland and Falu, we hold that the lack of knowledge of the
proximity of a school does not violate due process."); United States v. Haynes,
19951 Dawson v. State 393
Baltimore Law Review
Jersey strayed from the majority view in State v. Ogar.76 In Ogar,
the court held that "the statute impose[d] a 'bright line test' based
strictly on distance. . . Simply put, if drugs are possessed with the
intent to distribute, distributed or dispensed anywhere within 1,000
feet of school property, the statutory proscription applies." 77 Rather
than imputing the knowledge requirement of the underlying New
Jersey drug distribution statute, as the Falu court had,78 the New
Jersey court adopted a strict liability approach to offenders of the
state's school-yard statute. 7
9
C. Vagueness and Overbreadth Arguments
Another type of due process attack on school-yard statutes is
one that argues that the statutes are void due to vagueness or
overbreadth s0 A vague statute violates a defendant's due process
rights because it "fails to give adequate notice of what conduct is
prohibited and . . . because of its imprecision, may also invite
arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement." 8'
881 F.2d 586, 590 (8th Cir. 1989) ("Knowledge by a defendant that the
distribution occurred within the 1,000 foot zone is not required."); United
States v. Holland, 810 F.2d 1215, 1223 (D.C. Cir. 1987) ("Congress' [sic]
heightened interest in protecting children from both the indirect and direct
perils of drug traffic amply supports its decision not to require a showing of
mens rea of the proximity of a school."); United States v. Agilar, 779 F.2d
123, 126 (2d Cir. 1985) ("[T]he statute is violated whether or not the seller
knows he is within the prohibited zone."); United States v. Cunningham, 615
F. Supp 519, 521 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) ("[T]he Court fails to see any basis for
'reading into' the statute any specific intent requirement concerning the element
of the location of the distribution. The plain language of the statute indicates
that no knowledge or intent need be present . . . . "); State v. Hermann, 474
N.W.2d 906, 909 (Wis. App. 1991) (holding that Wisconsin school-yard statute
incorporated mens rea requirement of underlying statute criminalizing drug
distribution).
76. State v. Ogar, 551 A.2d 1037, 1042 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1989); see also
State v. Moore, 782 P.2d 497, 504 (Utah 1989) (holding that Utah school-yard
statute provided for strict criminal liability and that defendant's lack of
knowledge of the proximity of his home to a school was not a defense).
The New Jersey statute at issue in Ogar closely paralleled the Maryland
school-yard statute. However, the New Jersey statute provided an affirmative
defense if the statutory violation took place within a private residence, as long
as no one age 17 or younger was present and no drug was distributed or
dispensed for profit. Compare N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:35-7 (West Supp. 1995)
with MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 286D (1992 Repl. Vol.).
77. Ogar, 551 A.2d at 1042.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. For a discussion of cases in which either vagueness or overbreath arguments
have been raised, see infra notes 81-103 and accompanying text.
81. State v. Burch, 545 So. 2d 279, 281 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1989) (citing
Southeastern Fisheries Assoc. v. Department of Natural Resources, 453 So. 2d
1351 (Fla. 1984)).
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In United States v. Agilar s2 the defendant argued that the federal
school-yard statute was vague because the 1000 foot demarcation line
was "not sufficiently ascertainable by the average person. "83 The
United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit rejected the
defendant's argument, reasoning that, under Falu,8 4 the statute was
violated regardless of whether the offender knew that he was within
the prohibited zone."5
The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, in Commonwealth
v. Taylor,86 also rejected a defendant's claim that the state's school-
yard statute was vague.17 The Taylor court found that the average
person would understand the statute's prohibitions and that the
statute "instruct[ed] the police on what [wa]s criminal, thereby
deterring arbitrary and discriminatory law enforcement."88
Likewise, in State v. Burch,89 a Florida state district court
followed Agilari" and rejected a vagueness attack on its state school-
yard statute. 9' The Burch court stated:
The instant legislation has as its obvious and laudable
purpose the curtailment of drug dealing near schools where
children congregate and we see no reason why the one
thousand foot distance requirement should not reasonably
be measured in a straight line to the school property's
nearest boundary line .... To suggest that the distance
should be calculated by some circuitous pedestrian route
would be a tortuous reading of the statute that would violate
its plain intent and meaning. 92
The Burch court also rejected the defendant's argument that the
statute violated the due process clause due to overbreadth. 93 An
overbreadth challenge is based upon a claim that the statute "reaches
not only illegal conduct, but also constitutionally protected conduct
....,9 The Burch court ruled that the overbreadth argument was
82. 779 F.2d 123 (2d Cir. 1985).
83. Id. at 126.
84. See supra text accompanying notes 68-74 for a discussion of United States v.
Falu.
85. Agilar, 779 F.2d at 126.
86. 596 N.E.2d 333 (Mass. 1992).
87. Id. at 336.
88. Id.
89. 545 So. 2d 279 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1989).
90. For a discussion of United States v. Agilar, see supra text accompanying notes
82-85.
91. Burch, 545 So. 2d at 281.
92. Id. (citing United States v. Ofarril, 779 F.2d 791 (2d Cir. 1985)).
93. Id.
94. State v. Brown, 547 A.2d 743, 746 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1988).
19951 Dawson v. State
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only applicable in cases pertaining to conduct protected by the First
Amendment. 95
Vagueness and overbreadth arguments were, similarly, rejected
by the New Jersey Superior Court in State v. Brown.96 In Brown,
the court found that the New Jersey statute distinctly articulated the
elements of the offense. 97 Accordingly, the court ruled that "[tihe
statute establishes clear guidelines which informs [sic] the public of
what is prohibited and instructs [sic] the police what is permitted,
thereby deterring arbitrary and discriminatory law enforcement. The
statute is not vague.
9 8
The Brown court then explored the defendant's claim that the
statute was overbroad. 99 The court held that, in order to make such
a determination, it was necessary to discern whether the statute
reached a 'substantial amount of constitutional conduct' . . . and
extend[ed] further than [wa]s necessary to accomplish a legitimate
state purpose."1°° While the court noted that First Amendment rights
and freedom of expression were most often the subject of an over-
breadth challenge, the Brown court found, in contrast to the court
in Burch,101 that an overbreadth argument could apply to any con-
stitutionally protected right. 02 The court, nevertheless, concluded that
the New Jersey school-yard statute did not infringe upon any con-
stitutionally protected right and, therefore, rejected the overbreadth
challenge.103
D. The Equal Protection Challenge
Other challenges to school-yard statutes have been based on
claims that the statutes violate constitutional equal protection rights. °4
95. Burch, 545 So. 2d at 281 (citing Southeastern Fisheries Assoc. v. Department
of Natural Resources, 453 So. 2d 1351 (Fla. 1984)). The court concluded that
one could not reasonably argue that selling cocaine within 1000 feet of a school
was conduct protected by the First Amendment. Id.
96. 547 A.2d 743 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1988).




101. For a discussion of State v. Burch, see supra text accompanying notes 89-95.
102. See Brown, 547 A.2d at 746.
103. Id.
104. U.S. CoNsT. amend. XIV, § 1. "No State shall make or enforce any law which
shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor
shall any state deprive any person of life, liberty or property, without due
process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal
protection of the laws." Id. (emphasis added). Although an equal protection
violation was not raised in Dawson, cases addressing equal protection issues
may provide valuable precedent for future challenges to the Maryland statute.
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One such argument is that the statutes are either overinclusive or
underinclusive and, consequently, that they do not "rationally effec-
tuate . . . [the legislative] purpose."' 0 5 Defendants have argued that
the statutes are overinclusive "because . . . [they] can apply to drug
transactions between adults that take place within private dwellings
proximate to schools and to those that occur during times when
schools are not in session."'' 1 Likewise, the statutes have been
criticized as underinclusive because they do not apply to other areas
where children congregate, such as playgrounds. 0 7
The overinclusiveness argument has been uniformly rejected. 08
Courts have found that the statutes are rationally related to the
legitimate legislative purpose of preventing children from being ex-
posed to the harmful effects of the drug trade. °9 This governmental
interest was reflected in the legislative history of the federal statute,
Courts, finding neither a fundamental right nor a suspect class to be implicated
by the statute, have applied a rational basis review to these equal protection
claims. See, e.g., United States v. Holland, 810 F.2d 1215, 1218-19 (D.C. Cir.
1987) ("The [federal school-yard] statute does not proscribe activities that are
legally protected, much less 'fundamental,' nor has it been shown to involve
any legally cognizable 'suspect' class.") (citations omitted).
105. See, e.g., United States v. Cross, 900 F.2d 66, 68 (6th Cir. 1990); see also
infra notes 106-16 and accompanying text.
106. United States v. Holland, 810 F.2d 1215, 1218 (D.C. Cir. 1987); see also
United States v. Crew, 916 F.2d 980, 983 (5th Cir. 1990) (defendant argued
that federal school-yard statute is overinclusive); United States v. Thornton,
901 F.2d 738, 739-40 (9th Cir. 1990) (same); United States v. Cross, 900 F.2d
66, 68 (6th Cir. 1990) (same).
107. See Crew, 916 F.2d at 983 (defendant argued that federal school-yard statute
was underinclusive); Thornton, 901 F.2d at 739 (same); Cross, 900 F.2d at 68
(same); Holland, 810 F.2d at 1218 (same). The Crew court noted, however,
that the federal statute was amended in 1988 to "include drug sales within 100
feet of a 'playground, youth center, public swimming pool and video arcade
facility."' Crew, 916 F.2d at 983 (quoting 21 U.S.C. § 845a (1985)).
108. See, e.g., Holland, 810 F.2d at 1219-20 (rejecting defendant's argument that
federal statute was overinclusive); accord Crew, 916 F.2d at 983 (same);
Thornton, 901 F.2d at 739-40 (same); Cross, 900 F.2d at 68 (same).
109. See, e.g., United States v. Agilar, 779 F.2d 123, 125 (2d Cir. 1985) ("Congress
wanted to lessen the risk that drugs would be readily available to school
children. It is surely rational to achieve that goal by increasing penalties for
those who sell drugs near schools."); accord Crew, 916 F.2d at 983 ("[P]roviding
increased penalties for drug sales near schools is more than rationally related
to the legitimate goal of protecting our nation's youth from drug related
crime."); Thornton, 901 F.2d at 740 ("Certainly, the congressional goal of
reducing the availability and hence the use of drugs by school children is
rationally achieved by increasing the penalties for those who sell drugs near
schools."); State v. Rodriguez, 542 A.2d 966, 969 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div.
1988) (holding that New Jersey school-yard statute was "rationally related to
a legitimate state interest in protecting school-aged children from the evils of
controlled dangerous substances . . .").
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which indicated that the statute was drafted in order to send "a
signal to drug dealers that [the legislature would] not tolerate their
presence near [its] schools.""1'0
The underinclusiveness argument has, likewise, invariably failed."'
Courts addressing these claims have adopted the reasoning, in Hol-
land, that even if drug transactions in non-school playgrounds and
recreation centers presented greater threats to children, "equal pro-
tection of the laws d[id] not require Congress in every instance to
order evils hierarchically according to their magnitude and to legislate
against the greater before the lesser."" 2 Moreover, in United States
v. Crew, the court noted that the federal school-yard statute was
amended in 1988 to "include drug sales within 100 feet of a 'play-
ground, youth center, public swimming pool and video arcade fa-
cility.' 113
It has been further argued that the statutes are underinclusive
because, while legislatures have determined that enhanced punish-
ments are necessary to remedy illicit drug distribution within 1000
feet of school property, they have provided no such heightened
penalties for assaults within the school zone." 4 The New Jersey
Superior Court Law Division rejected this argument in State v.
Rodriguez,"5 holding that the "defendants' argument that the statute
denie[d] them equal protection because it d[id] not go far enough
must be rejected, since it [wals reasonably related to a valid legislative
goal to deter the distribution of controlled dangerous substances near
school property.' '116
Another equal protection argument raised by defendants is that
the school-yard statutes have a disparate impact on racial minorities
who more often reside in inner cities where there is greater population
density and a higher number of schools." 7 According to the rule
110. 130 Cong. Rec. S559 (daily ed. January 31, 1984) (statement of Sen. Paula
Hawkins); accord Crew, 916 F.2d at 982 (citing Senator Hawkins's statement
with approval); Thornton, 901 F.2d at 740 (citing Senator Hawkins's statement);
Holland, 810 F.2d at 1219 (concurring with Senator Hawkins's statement).
111. See infra notes 112-16.
112. Holland, 810 F.2d at 1219; accord Thornton, 901 F.2d at 740 (citing Holland
with approval and rejecting, on underinclusiveness grounds, defendant's claim
that federal statute violated equal protection); Cross, 900 F.2d at 68 (same).
113. Crew, 916 F.2d at 983 (quoting 21 U.S.C. § 845a (1985)).
114. Such an argument was raised by the defendant in State v. Rodriguez, 542 A.2d
966, 969 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1988).
115. Id.
116. Id. The court also noted: "Equal protection is not denied because a penal
statute might have gone farther than it did. ... The Legislature has wide
discretion in the creation or recognition of different classes of offenders for
separate treatment." Id. (citations omitted).
117. See infra note 120.
[Vol. 24
adopted by the Court in Washington v. Davis,' disparate impact,
in and of itself, would not be sufficient to support an equal protection
claim. This rule provides that
a law, neutral on its face and serving ends otherwise within
the power of government to pursue, is [not] invalid under
the Equal Protection Clause simply because it may affect a
greater proportion of one race than another. Disproportion-
ate impact is not irrelevant, but it is not the sole touchstone
of an invidious racial discrimination forbidden by the Con-
stitution. Standing alone, it does not trigger the rule that
racial classifications are to be subjected to the strictest
scrutiny and are justifiable only by the weightiest of consid-
erations. 19
Even novel "disparate impact" arguments have not persuaded the
courts to invalidate school-yard statutes. Courts have rejected such
arguments on the grounds that such arguments either lacked statistical
evidence or failed to prove discriminatory intent or purpose necessary
to support such a disparate impact argument. 120
For example, the Supreme Court of Utah, in State v. Moore,12'
rejected this type of equal protection challenge to Utah's school-yard
statute. 22 Specifically, the defendant in Moore contended that the
school-yard statute had a disparate impact on small town residents. 123
The Supreme Court of Utah rejected that argument, stating:
All defendants state-wide who distribute a controlled sub-
stance for value within 1,000 feet of a public school are
governed by this statute and susceptible to its enhanced
118. 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
119. Id. at 242.
120. See United States v. Agilar, 779 F.2d 123, 126 (2d Cir. 1985) ("[S]trained
theory that [federal school-yard] statute has disproportionate impact on mem-
bers of racial minorities, more of whom live, it is asserted, within 1,000 feet
of schools . . . fails, among other reasons, for lack of any claim, much less a
showing of a discriminatory purpose."), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1068 (1986);
United States v. Dixon, 619 F. Supp. 1399, 1401 n.3 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (rejecting
disparate impact argument because defendant offered "no evidence, statistical
or otherwise, to support his assumption that the statute burdenfed] one race
more than another"); United States v. Nieves, 608 F. Supp. 1147, 1151
(S.D.N.Y. 1985) ("Proof of discriminatory intent is required to sustain an
equal protection claim . . . ."); United States v. Burch, 545 So. 2d 279, 283-
84 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1989) (rejecting disparate impact claim "since it is not
supported by statistical evidence and the defendants did not prove a discrimi-
natory intent on the part of the state").
121. 782 P.2d 497 (Utah 1989).
122. Id. at 503-04. The statute at issue in Moore was UTAH CODE ANN. § 58-37-
8(5) (Supp. 1994).
123. Moore, 782 P.2d at 503-04.
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penalties .... [Defendant] resides in a small city. Conse-
quently, the school-yard may be more readily located within
1,000 feet of his residence and his drug-dealing activities
than is the case with drug-dealers in larger cities. However,
this increased proximity does not make defendant dissimilar
and therefore entitle him to dissimilar treatment. 24
Courts have similarly rejected claims that school-yard statutes violate
the Equal Protection clause by creating arbitrary and disparate treat-
ment based on the location of the offense.15'
Despite the numerous and diverse attacks on school-yard statutes
that had been addressed by both federal and state courts, the Mar-
yland appellate courts had not ruled on the constitutionality of
school-yard statutes until 1993, when Dawson v. State 26 was decided.
The Court of Appeals of Maryland, however, acknowledged Bowie
Inn, Inc. v. City of Bowie12 7 as precedential authority both for the
scope of the state legislature's police power and for the presumption
that school-yard statutes were constitutional. 2 8 In Bowie, the court
stated that an exercise of police power by the legislature would be
upheld if the statute "b[ore] a real and substantial relation to the
public health, morals, safety, and welfare of the citizens of this
state." 129
III. THE INSTANT CASE
The Court of Appeals of Maryland, in Dawson v. State,30
affirmed the appellant's conviction by the Circuit Court of Harford
124. Id. at 503.
125. See United States v. Pitts, 908 F.2d 458, 460 (9th Cir. 1990) (refusing to
invalidate federal school-zone statute merely because 80%70 of the city of Spokane
was within 1000 feet of a school); Harrison v. State, 560 So. 2d 1124, 1128
(Ala. Crim. App. 1989) (refusing to find equal protection violation merely
because Alabama school-yard statute had disparate impact on urban areas);
Commonwealth v. Taylor, 596 N.E.2d 333, 335 (Mass. 1992) (rejecting disparate
impact argument that claimed there was no locale within the city of Boston
which was not within 1000 feet of a school); State v. Brown, 547 A.2d 743,
747 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1988) (rejecting defendant's argument that New
Jersey school-zone statute violated equal protection due to disparate treatment
of the same conduct on different sides of the street based on a "theoretical
line at an arbitrary distance from school property"); State v. Hermann, 474
N.W.2d 906, 911 (Wis. App. 1991) (rejecting argument that Wisconsin school-
yard statute has a disparate impact on those who sold drugs within 1000 feet
of a school 'by accident of geography"').
126. 329 Md. 275, 619 A.2d 111 (1993).
127. 274 Md. 230, 335 A.2d 679 (1975).
128. Dawson, 329 Md. at 283-84, 619 A.2d at 115 (citing Bowie Inn, Inc. v. City
of Bowie, 274 Md. 230, 236, 335 A.2d 679, 683 (1975)).
129. Bowie Inn, 274 Md. at 236, 335 A.2d at 683.
130. 329 Md. 275, 619 A.2d 111 (1993).
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County for violation of Maryland's school-yard statute."' The court
began its analysis by recognizing that "the General Assembly has
broad authority, under the exercise of the State's police power, to
criminalize certain conduct and to decide what penalties to impose
for the commission of crimes.'1 2 The court then noted that the
exercise of the legislature's police power must remain within the
limits of the United States and Maryland constitutions. "
The court then examined the scope of the legislature's police
power. 34 The court of appeals quoted Bowie Inn, Inc. v. City of
Bowie'35 for the proposition that:
The exercise by the Legislature of the police power will not
be interfered with unless it is shown to be exercised arbi-
trarily, oppressively or unreasonably. The wisdom or expe-
diency of a law adopted in the exercise of the police power
of a state is not subject to judicial review, and the law will
not be held void if there are any considerations relating to
the public welfare by which it can be supported. Such a
statute carries with it a strong presumption of constitution-
ality. 136
The court also noted that, because a law enacted pursuant to the
legislature's police power is presumed to be constitutional, "its
challenger bears the burden of affirmatively and clearly establishing
its invalidity."'13 7 Furthermore, the court stated that an examination
of both the statutory language and the purpose of the statute was
necessary to discern whether there was a substantial relationship
between the statute and its objective. 3 '
The Dawson court found that the language of the provision
clearly reflected the legislature's intention to create a preventative
131. Id. The court first addressed Dawson's assertion that there was insufficient
evidence presented to the jury to prove that he was the individual who sold
the cocaine to the police officers. Id. at 281-82, 619 A.2d at 114. The Maryland
high court had little difficulty finding that the testimony and identification of
the officers, as well as Dawson's admission to being present at the scene of
the drug sale, provided ample evidence for a rational jury to conclude that
Dawson was the offender. Id.
132. Id. at 283, 619 A.2d at 115 (citing Rice v. State, 311 Md. 116, 126, 532 A.2d
1357, 1362 (1987), and Greenwald v. State, 221 Md. 235, 240, 155 A.2d 894,
897 (1959)).
133. Id.
134. Id. at 283-84, 619 A.2d at 115.
135. 274 Md. 230, 335 A.2d 679.
136. Dawson, 329 Md. at 283-84, 619 A.2d at 115 (quoting Bowie Inn, Inc. v. City
of Bowie, 274 Md. 230, 236, 335 A.2d 679, 683 (1975)).
137. Id. at 284, 619 A.2d at 115 (citing Salisbury Beauty Schs. v. Board of
Cosmetology, 268 Md. 32, 48, 300 A.2d 367, 378 (1973)).
138. Id. at 284, 619 A.2d at 115.
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measure to stop drug use among school-age children. 139 Relying on
the legislative history of both section 286D' 40 and the New Jersey
statute,'14 upon which the Maryland statute was modeled, the court
concluded that the Maryland legislature sought to prevent drug
dealers from victimizing school children as potential customers.142
Furthermore, the court found that "the General Assembly sought
to limit schoolchildren's exposure to the violent crime and demoral-
izing environment associated with the drug trade."'' 43 Accordingly,
the court held that the legislature enacted the statute in order to
fulfill these goals by creating a 24-hour drug-free zone around
schools. 144
After determining that there was sufficient evidence to support
Dawson's conviction, the court considered Dawson's claim that sec-
tion 286D, Maryland's school-yard statute, violated his due process
rights under the United States Constitution and the Maryland Dec-
laration of Rights. 45 According to Dawson, the school-yard statute,
which increased penalties for defendants who sold drugs within 1000
feet of a school, did not substantially relate to the legislative goal
of protecting children, absent proof of the presence of children during
the commission of the crime.'" The Dawson court unanimously
rejected this contention. 47
The court rejected the appellant's argument that the statute was
overly broad because it applied at times when school was out of
session and thus children were unlikely to be in the vicinity. 48 The
court reasoned that a number of activities involving children occur
139. Id. at 285, 619 A.2d at 116.
140. Id. The court examined Senator Young's testimony about Senate Bill 289,
which stated: "The 'drug-free school zone['] [statute] seeks to establish not
only the psychological mind set of a clean environment, but backs it up with
the muscle needed to insure that environment." Id. The court also considered
the Senate Floor Report on Senate Bill 289, which provided: 'The bill is
intended to address the drug problem and to enhance the educational environ-
ment by creating a drug-free zone around school property."' Id.
141. Id. (citing State v. Brown, 547 A.2d 743, 747 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1988)
(interpreting N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:35-7 (West Supp. 1995))). The Brown court
held that the New Jersey drug-free school zone statute was intended to protect
children from both the sale of drugs and the indirect harm from exposure to
an unsafe environment. Brown, 547 A.2d at 747.
142. Dawson, 329 Md. at 285, 619 A.2d at 116.
143. Id. The court stated: "Section 286D was thus an attempt to shield children
from the direct and indirect effects of drug trading including observing drug
sales and the commission of violent crimes .... ." Id.
144. Id.
145. Id. at 282, 619 A.2d at 114-15.
146. Id. at 282-83, 619 A.2d at 115.
147. Id. at 286-89, 619 A.2d at 116-17.
148. Id. at 286, 619 A.2d at 116-17.
[Vol. 24
on school grounds while school is not in session. 49 Moreover, the
court maintained that the legislature's intent was not merely to limit
the hours of drug activities surrounding schools, but also to abolish
the drug marketplace altogether. 50 The court further reasoned:
Once an area is known as a drug market, it may draw
prospective drug purchasers or sellers throughout the course
of the day. In addition, discarded drug packaging, para-
phernalia, or litter from drug sales may remain in an area
heavily trafficked by curious children. A reasonable way for
the General Assembly to limit the potential exposure of
children to such activities was to convince those engaged in
the drug market that the risks associated with conducting
business in school areas, regardless of the hour, greatly
outweighed their potential profits. If the drug market was
removed from the area surrounding school property, it could
logically follow that the likelihood of children having ex-
posure to drugs would also decrease. 5'
The court therefore ruled that despite the statute's application
during times when children were not present, the statute was ration-
ally related to the legislative goal of safeguarding children.1 2 The
court cited several federal decisions, including United States v.
Nieves,' 3 United States v. Dixon,15 United States v. Cunningham'55
and United States v. Agilar,1- 6 for the proposition that the federal
drug-free school zone statute was constitutionally valid as applied to
transactions not involving children.'1 The court acknowledged that
"the potential scope of section 286D may be broad" in light of the
statute's applicability, despite the lack of presence of school children
at the time of the offense.1 8 Relying on United States v. Crew, 59
however, and recognizing that every court reviewing similar school-
149. Id. at 286, 619 A.2d at 116.
150. Id.
151. Id. at 286, 619 A.2d at 116-17.
152. Id. at 287, 619 A.2d at 117.
153. United States v. Nieves, 608 F. Supp. 1147, 1149-50 (S.D.N.Y. 1985).
154. United States v. Dixon, 619 F. Supp. 1399, 1400 (S.D.N.Y. 1985).
155. United States v. Cunningham, 615 F. Supp. 519, 520-21 (S.D.N.Y. 1985).
156. United States v. Agilar, 612 F. Supp 889, 890-91 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 779 F.2d
123 (2d Cir. 1985).
157. Dawson, 329 Md. at 287-88, 619 A.2d at 117.
158. Id. at 288-90, 619 A.2d at 117-18 (quoting United States v. Crew, 916 F.2d
980, 983 (5th Cir. 1990)).
159. Crew, 916 F.2d at 983 (holding that school-yard statute would be ineffectual
if protection was limited solely to hours during which school was in session).
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yard statutes has upheld their constitutionality, the court held that
section 286D did not violate the due process clause. 6' Accordingly,
the court affirmed Dawson's convictions. 61
IV. APPLICATION
The court of appeals' determination that section 286D was
constitutional closely paralleled the decisions of federal and state
courts that had tested the constitutionality of school-yard statutes. 62
The Dawson court properly determined that the legislature was within
its authority, pursuant to its police power, to enact a statute pro-
scribing drug activity near a school and to determine an appropriate
penalty for such a crime. 163
In Dawson, the court of appeals, in accordance with other
jurisdictions that had ruled on similar statutes, focused primarily on
the legislative intent or purpose behind the Maryland school-yard
statute in order to determine its constitutionality.' l Once the court
ascertained the legislature's goal, 165 it could easily conclude that the
intended goal was accomplished. The Dawson court appropriately
determined that the legislative purpose in enacting the statute ex-
tended beyond protecting children from solicitation by drug dealers.l6
The court properly discerned that the general assembly also wished
to protect children from the residual negative effects of the drug
trade, by increasing the risks to drug dealers conducting business in
the vicinity of schools. 67 Such policy considerations, furthered by
the court's validation of the breadth of the statute's scope, may well
promote an environment in which children will be able to secure
their education safely-a goal of utmost importance to societal
progress.
The Dawson decision may provide significant precedent upon
which Maryland courts may rely if the Maryland legislature enacts
160. Dawson, 329 Md. at 288-90, 619 A.2d at 117-18.
161. Id. at 290, 619 A.2d at 118.
162. See id. at 288-90, 619 A.2d at 118.
163. See supra text accompanying notes 134-37.
164. See supra text accompanying notes 139-44; see also United States v. Falu, 776
F.2d 46, 50 (2d Cir. 1985) (examining legislative intent behind federal school-
yard statute); United States v. Nieves, 608 F. Supp. 1147, 1149 (S.D.N.Y.
1985) (same); State v. Burch, 545 So. 2d 279, 281 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1989)
(examining legislative intent behind Florida school-yard statute); State v. Brown,
547 A.2d 743, 747 (N.J. Ct. Law Div. 1988) (examining legislative intent behind
New Jersey school-yard statute); State v. Moore, 782 P.2d 497, 502 (Utah
1989) (examining legislative intent behind Utah school-yard statute).
165. Dawson, 329 A.2d at 285, 619 A.2d at 116.
166. Id. at 285-86, 619 A.2d at 116-17.
167. Id. at 284-85, 619 A.2d at 116.
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related legislation, such as a "Weapons-Free School Zone" statute. 6 1
The constitutionality of the federal Gun-Free School Zone Act' 69 has
been widely litigated in both the federal district courts and the federal
courts of appeal. 170 The United States Supreme Court recently struck
down the Act as an unconstitutional exercise of Congress' power
under the Commerce Clause in United States v. Lopez. 7' Justice
168. For a discussion of the proposed Maryland Weapons-Free School Zone Act,
see infra note 173.
169. Gun Free School Zones Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-647, § 1702, 104 Stat.
4844-45 (1990) (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 922(q) (1994)). The statute states that
"[it] shall be unlawful for any individual knowingly to possess a firearm at a
place the individual knows or has reasonable cause to believe is a school zone."
18 U.S.C. § 922(q)(2)(a) (1994). The Act defines "school zone" similarly to
Maryland's definition in the drug-free school zone statute. Compare MD. ANN.
CODE art. 27, § 286D(a)(l) (1992 Repl. Vol.) ("In, on or within 1,000 feet of
any property owned or leased to any elementary school or school board and
used for elementary or secondary education . . ... ") with 18 U.S.C. §
921(a)(25)(A)-(B) (1994) ("in, or on the grounds of, a public, parochial or
private school; or . . . within a distance of 1,000 feet from the grounds of a
public, parochial or private school").
170. The defendant argued that the Gun-Free School Zone Act was an unconstitu-
tional exercise of Congress's power under the Commerce Clause of the United
States Constitution. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. Federal courts have varied
widely in their rulings on the constitutionality of the Gun-Free School Zone
Act. Compare United States v. Knowles, 29 F.3d 947 (5th Cir. 1994) (finding
Gun-Free School Zone Act to be unconstitutional exercise of Congress's power
under the Commerce Clause); United States v. Lopez, 2 F.3d 1342 (5th Cir.
1993) (same), aff'd, 115 S. Ct. 1624 (1995); United States v. Bownds, 860 F.
Supp. 336, 337 (S.D. Miss. 1994) (same); United States v. Trigg, 842 F. Supp.
450 (D. Kan. 1994) (same) and United States v. Morrow, 834 F. Supp. 364
(N.D. Ala. 1993) (same) with United States v. Campbell, 12 F.3d 147 (8th Cir.
1994) (finding Gun-Free School Zone Act to be constitutional exercise of
Congress's power under the Commerce Clause); United States v. Edwards, 13
F.3d 291 (9th Cir. 1993), judgment vacated, 115 S. Ct. 1819 (1995) (same);
United States v. Ornelas, 841 F. Supp. 1087 (D. Colo. 1994) (same) and United
States v. Holland, 841 F. Supp. 143 (E.D. Pa. 1993) (same).
171. United States v. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. 1624 (1995). The majority held that the
federal weapons-free zone statute exceeded Congress's power to regulate under
the Commerce Clause because "[t]he possession of a gun in a local school
zone [wa]s in no sense an economic activity that [could] ... substantially
affect any sort of interstate commerce." Id. at 1634.
Justice Breyer, with whom Justices Stevens, Souter and Ginsberg joined
in dissent, argued that the decision turned on the issue of whether "Congress
[could] rationally have found that 'violent crime in school zones,' through-its
effect on the 'quality of education,' significantly (or substantially) affect[ed]
'interstate' or 'foreign commerce'?" Id. at 1659 (Breyer, J., dissenting). The
dissent concluded: "As long as one views the commerce connection, not as a
'technical legal conception,' but as 'a practical one,' ... the answer to this
question must be yes." Id. (citation omitted).
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Kennedy, joined by Justice O'Connor, seemed to encourage states to
enact gun-free legislation, and/or related measures, in a concurring
opinion in Lopez, which argued:
[I]t is doubtful that any State, or indeed any reasonable
person, would argue that it is wise policy to allow students
to carry guns on school premises, considerable disagreement
exists about how best to accomplish that goal. In this
circumstance, the theory and utility of our federalism are
revealed, for the States may perform their role as labora-
tories for experimentation to devise various solutions where
the best solution is far from clear. 72
Therefore, although Lopez struck down the federal gun-free school
zone statute, it may act as an impetus for the states that have not
yet enacted weapons-free school zone statutes to do so. Persistent
Maryland legislators may soon secure a favorable vote on a Weapons-
Free School Zone bill from the Judicial Proceedings Committee 3
and Maryland courts may rely upon Dawson to uphold such a statute
against a constitutional challenge.
Dawson attacked Maryland's school-yard statute because he
claimed that it was not substantially related to the legislative goal;
he claimed that the statute violated substantive due process. 174 The
court's reasoning, in rejecting Dawson's argument, will likely lead
lower Maryland courts to reject other due process and equal protec-
tion challenges to the school-yard statute. Finally, the court's lengthy
dictum, which cites the various federal and state court decisions that
172. Id. at 1641 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
173. SENATE OF MARYLAND JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS COMM., BILL ANALYSIS, S.B. 172,
WEAPONS-FREE SCHOOL ZONE (1994). The bill was modeled after Maryland's
drug-free school zone statute and outlawed carrying or possessing a firearm,
knife, or other deadly weapon within 1000 feet of school property. Id. Weapons-
free school zone bills were introduced in the Maryland State Senate in 1989,
1992, 1993 and 1994, and in the Maryland House of Delegates in 1992, but
none of these bills ever reached the floor for a vote in either the house or
senate. Id. The 1989 Senate Bill, number 242, received an unfavorable report
from the Judiciary Proceedings Committee. Id. The 1992 bills-Senate Bill 506
and House Bill 1273-failed in the Judicial Proceedings Committee and received
an unfavorable report from the Judiciary Committee, respectively. Id. The
1993 Senate Bill, number 182, was withdrawn. Id. The 1994 Senate Bill, number
172, failed in the Judicial Proceedings Committee. SENATE OF MARYLAND
JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS COMM. VOTING RECORD, S.B. 172, MAR. 22, 1994. In
1995, Senate Bill 361 received an unfavorable report from the Judicial Pro-
ceedings Committee by a vote of seven to four. SENATE OF MARYLAND JUDICIAL
PROCEEDINGS COMM. VOTING RECORD, S.B. 361, MAR. 15, 1995.
174. Dawson v. State, 329 Md. 275, 283, 619 A.2d 111, 115 (1993).
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have rejected challenges to school-yard statutes, may foreshadow the
court of appeals' own stance if it should revisit similar claims in the
future.
V. CONCLUSION
The significance of Dawson v. State lies both in the court of
appeals's validation of the Maryland legislature's authority to enact
the school-yard statute and in the court's interpretation of the leg-
islative purpose behind the statute. The court's ruling, that the statute
was rationally related to the legislature's goal of protecting school
children from the evils associated with the drug trade, 75 conforms
to those in other jurisdictions' that have rejected due process attacks
on school-yard statutes. 76
The court of appeals has also provided the first Maryland
precedent to be followed when Maryland courts face other challenges
to the state school-yard statute. In addition, if Maryland enacts a
weapons-free school zone statute that provides school children with
additional protection from violent crime, Maryland courts may be
able to use the Dawson analysis to uphold the statute against con-
stitutional challenges similar to those rejected in Dawson.
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175. Id. at 285-86, 619 A.2d at 117-18.
176. See, e.g, United States v. Campbell, 935 F.2d 39 (4th Cir. 1991); United States
v. Rowe, 911 F.2d 50 (8th Cir. 1990); United States v. Cross, 900 F.2d 66
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